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Refutations, the expressions of disagreement in dialogue, are part of our everyday 
conversations. Arguments and discussions are present in our daily lives since every 
possible subject that anyone could speak about embraces an uncountable array of 
different opinions. Taking this into consideration, the aim of the present paper is to 
analyse natural occurring data in order to examine the different mechanisms used when 
engaging in disagreement, and how refutations target different meaning types; namely, 
assertions and presuppositions. The initial hypothesis and the one that would be proved 
in this paper by interpreting naturalistic data, is that, in accordance with the theoretic 
literature, direct refutations such as No, that’s not true target assertions, whereas 
indirect ones like Hey, wait a minute, target presuppositions. For this purpose, data 
gathered from 22 episodes of an American TV talk-show was probed and classified 
according to the linguistic meaning of the utterance they refute: assertion or 
presupposition; and the refutation type: direct or indirect. Furthermore, it was also 
considered whether the refutation affected the immediately preceding utterance or not. 
As a secondary point, the pragmatic theory of verbal courtesy was also borne in mind to 
see whether it could help understand the distribution of the refutations dealt with along 
the texts. In the light of the insights gained from the analysis in the aforementioned 
field, some generalizations and conclusions were drawn by connecting refutation types 
to meaning types and the influence of the pragmatic theory of verbal courtesy. The 
results do not show a significantly tight relation between the refutation type and the 
linguistic meaning, as both assertions and presuppositions were negated by means of 
direct and indirect refutations, and Hey, wait a minute did not exclusively target 
presuppositions.  
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Participants in conversations constantly find themselves in situations where their 
opinions differ from those around them. Conversations are part of our daily lives, and 
they often lead to disagreements as a result of the opposite views human beings tend to 
have over every possible subject that surrounds us. For expressing this disagreement we 
make use of refutations. In general, disagreements are dispreferred over agreements 
(Pomerantz, 1984), as according to Brown and Levinson (1987) (as cited in Kleuter, 
2007), they cause a threat to the listener. These authors’ theory of politeness claims that 
every individual has a self-image they want to maintain, and the speech acts that 
damage this face are considered Face Threatening Acts (Kleuter, 2007). Refutations 
could be classified among these acts, forasmuch as by being in disagreement with the 
foregoing utterance, they question the truthfulness of the expressed opinion: an act that 
damages the desire to be endorsed and respectable by others; or as Brown and Levinson 
(1987) name it, the positive face (Kleuter, 2007). 
Even though studies have been conducted in this domain in order to analyse the 
different refutation methods and what they depend on, (Shanon, 1976 as cited in Potts, 
2008; von Fintel, 2004 as cited in Potts, 2008; Potts, 2008; Castroviejo et al., 2013) 
there is need for further investigation. Reviewing relevant research, studies have 
suggested that direct refutations are employed in response to assertions (Kadmon, 
2001), whereas for presuppositional utterances, indirect refutations are preferred (von 
Fintel, 2004). On this basis, the present paper is a small-scale attempt to analyse 
refutations to test whether the literature is supported by the results from verbal 
interactions in natural conversations. With this in mind, I will try to answer the 
following research questions:  
a)  Does direct refutation only negate assertion? 
b) Does indirect refutation only negate presupposition? 
c) How do contents get refuted? 
In order to do so, I will first introduce the literature review on this domain in section 
2. Secondly, in section 3 I will describe the data and explain how I organized and 
annotated it, and then, in section 4 I will proceed to the analysis of the data and the 
discussion of the results. I will conclude by providing an answer to the research 
questions posed in the preceding paragraph.   
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It is important to point out that this research exclusively focuses on the relationship 
between meaning types and refutation types, and purported to offer generalized 
conclusions from that literature; however, it does not take other phenomenon such as 
turn taking (Sacks et al., 1974; Stivers et al., 2009), or socio-cultural variables into 
account due to time and space constraints. 
2. Theoretical Background 
In the ensuing section I will provide a general overview of previous research on 
refutations. I will introduce the framework for the study of the data that comprises the 
focus on this research. For this purpose, I will first explain the two meaning types that 
can be distinguished: assertion and presupposition. Subsequently, I will give a general 
overview of Face Threatening Acts and the presence of refutations among them; and 
finally, I will describe the role of refutations in argumentative discussion and how the 
different refutation types serve as a way to distinguish linguistic meanings. Throughout 
the literature we will encounter different concepts such as rejection, disagreement or 
refutation. We should bear in mind that the concept will vary depending on the author; 
nonetheless, they all refer to the same phenomenon that will be elaborated on this paper: 
refutations.  
2.1 Meaning Types: Assertion and Presupposition 
The comparison of different aspects of linguistic meaning is a pivotal issue in both 
pragmatics and semantics, and has been the focus of many of the linguistic experimental 
works carried out for the understanding of the global meaning of utterances (Schwarz, 
2015). As a reflection of this issue’s relevance, there are several tests that have been 
conducted in order to distinguish between what contributes to the truth conditions of an 
utterance from what does not. Among them, we find those in the domain of modal 
verbs: the changeability test (Faller, 2002), the deniability test (Murray, 2010) or the 
assent/dissent diagnosis (Papafragou, 2005), which although with different terminology, 
share the same purpose: distinguishing asserted content from non-asserted. This paper 
will deal with the differences between two linguistic meanings; namely, assertion and 





2.1.1 Assertions  
For the purposes of this paper, I will put aside the numerous studies concerning 
assertion as a speech act and its illocutionary force, and I will focus on its ability to act 
as the foregrounded content of declarative sentences.  
Although the most common concept to refer to this linguistic meaning is by the 
term assertion, it can go by various different names, such as extensional content, what is 
said or assertion entailment (Potts, 2005). In any case, I will be referring to it as 
assertion or at-issue content. 
The at-issue content is the part of the utterance that comprises the speaker’s main 
propositional meaning (Schwarz, 2015), and changes the conversationalists assumptions 
about the discourse by making further contributions (Chierchia & McConnell-Ginet, 
1990). Even though it will normally coincide with the main clause; there might be cases 
in which we might find the asserted proposition in the embedded clause (Simons, 2007).  
Moreover, according to Stalnaker (1999), assertions contain the following self-
evident truths:  
1) They are “expressions of a proposition” that “represent the world as being a 
certain way” (p.78). Nevertheless, the addressee does not necessarily have to 
accept the content of it. 
2) They require a context involving a speaker and some hearers to whom the 
assertion will be directed; and each of them will have their own beliefs and 
objectives. 
3) There might be occasions in which the assertions will be context dependent, 
considering the speaker and the time of the assertion. 
4) The essential effect of the assertions is to “affect the attitude of the participants 
in the context” (p.79); that is, to “change their presuppositions in the 
conversation by adding the content of what is asserted to what is presupposed” 
(p.86).  
2.1.2 Presuppositions 
On the other hand, presuppositions are commonly thought to exhibit two 
characteristics that distinguish them from assertions (Karttunen,1973; Stalnaker,1973, 
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1974 as cited in Schwarz, 2015). Firstly, they do not add any new information to the 
discourse (typically) (Schwarz, 2015); instead, it is the backgrounded information 
which not only speakers consider as mutual knowledge, but also as taken as true by all 
of the participants in the ongoing conversation (Geurts, 2017). That is, it is assumed to 
be in the “common base” of the discourse and it is derived through an inference (García 
Murga, 2014). However, in Stalnaker’s view (1973), (1999) (as cited in Harvey, 2014), 
there are some propositional attitudes “adopted by a speaker in which some proposition 
is treated as if it were true, regardless of whether it actually is”(p.10). Based on this 
idea, there might be cases in which presuppositions introduce plain new information as 
if it was given, pretending that the hearers are already familiar with it (Geurts, 2017). 
According to Grice (1975), this is a situation of exploitation in which “the speaker 
exploits the rules of communication by breaking them” (Geurts, 2017, p.184). This 
phenomenon is called accommodation (Lewis, 1979; Beaver & Zeevat 2007 as cited in 
Geurts, 2017), and even if in most cases the hearer will be prepared to adjust to the new 
information that was taken for granted as given and cooperate with the speaker, there 
may be occasions in which if the information presented is noteworthy, the 
presupposition will be controversial (Geurts, 2017). Note the difference in the ensuing 
examples presented by Geurts (2017:184-185): 
(1) a. I’m sorry I’m late, my bicycle broke down. 
 b. I’m sorry I’m late, my chariot broke down. 
  While in both cases there is a presupposition that the speaker owns a means of 
transportation: a) a bicycle and b) a chariot; example (a) would let the speaker away 
with the presupposition, while example (b) would not. This situation would arise since 
while owning a bicycle is common, owning a chariot is remarkable, and to presuppose 
remarkable information is controversial (Geurts, 2017).  
Secondly, another characteristic which is the hallmark for the presupposition status is 
projection. Presuppositions are not affected when embedded under different linguistic 
contexts, such as negation, questions, and modals. Instead, they survive, or more 
technically, they project (Schwarz, 2015:4; see also García Murga, 2014 for Spanish). 
(2) a. John stopped smoking 
b. John didn’t stop smoking 
c. Did John stop smoking? 
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(3) a. Lee kissed Jenny 
b. Lee didn’t kiss Jenny 
c. Did Lee kiss Jenny?  
In example (2) we can see how even if examples (b) and (c) do not express the 
asserted meaning of (a), the presupposition that John used to smoke prior to the moment 
of speaking projects in all the variations (Schwarz, 2015). However, since this 
phenomenon is not one of the characteristics of at-issue content, assertions are 
cancelled. As reflected in examples (3b) and (3c), the assertion that Lee kissed Jenny 
does not project when negating or questioning the sentence.  
Another way to recognise presuppositions is by the presence of so-called 
presupposition triggers. Presupposition triggers are the linguistic expressions that signal 
that what the speaker is uttering is common ground; hence, they are responsible for a 
presupposition (Chierchia & McConnell-Ginet, 1990; Kadmon, 2001; García Murga, 
2014). Even though there is a wide array of presupposition triggers in language, I will 
only portray a few. I will draw on the description and examples provided in Geurts, 
2017; Beaver, 2001; Karttunen, 1971 and Chierchia & McConnell-Ginet, 1990.  
1) Factive verbs :  
Verbs such as realize or regret, presuppose the truth of the complement and 
furthermore, the negation of the main verb does not affect the presupposition.   
a) John realized he had no money. ( John had no money) 
b) John didn’t realize he had no money. ( John had no money) 
 
2) Adjectives:  
“The infinitive complements of certain adjectives such as glad, proud,or lucky,  are 
also presupposed to represent true propositions” (Karttunen, 1971:340). 
a) John was glad to see his parents ( John saw his parents) 
 
3) Cleft constructions (It cleft, wh cleft):   
a) It was in November that we left for Kiev. (we left for Kiev) 




4) Definite NPs: 
a) The pizzeria in the Vatican is closed on Sundays. ( There is a pizzeria in 
the Vatican) 
2.2 Refutation 
To refute, as defined in the Cambridge Online Dictionary is “to say or prove that a 
person, statement, opinion, etc. is wrong or false” (Cambridge University Press, 2017).   
As opposed to justification, which is certainly of monologal nature, a refutation is an 
illocutionary speech act that presupposes at least two speakers: the participant uttering 
the refutation and the one to whom that refutation is intended. Thus, it is a reactive act 
of disagreement towards a previous assertion, and as a result creates a controversy 
among the participants in the ongoing discourse (Moeschler, 1982). 
In general terms, speakers tend to avoid disagreement, as it is the dispreferred option 
if we are to choose between agreeing and disagreeing (Pomerantz, 1984). While 
agreeing with someone strengthens the interlocutors desire to be approved of, as it 
shows support towards its opinion; disagreeing is perceived as a threat and causes 
discomfort (Pomerantz, 1984, as cited in Sifianou, 2012).  One of the most influential 
theories of politeness is the one developed by Brown and Levinson (1987) (as cited in 
Kleuter 2007) where the concept face was introduced. This concept is defined as the 
public self-image that every member of every culture gives of themselves or of others. 
Face can be damaged, enhanced or maintained by interaction; however, everyone 
endeavours to save both, their own as well as the interlocutor’s (Kleuter, 2007).  Brown 
and Levinson (1987) claim that face has two aspects: positive and negative. Positive 
face is reflected in the desire to be approved of, desirable or respected by others, 
whereas negative face is the freedom to act as the individual chooses, being independent 
by not having their actions imposed by others (Holtgraves, 1997). 
Certain illocutionary acts are likely to threaten one of these faces or both (Wagner, 
2004). These acts are called Face Threatening Acts, (from now on FTA), and according 
to Brown and Levinson (1987), they are those that do not respect the hearer’s need for 
space (negative face), their desire for their self-image to be sustained (positive face), or 
both (Wagner, 2004).  
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Amongst these acts we find the case of disagreement, which by questioning the 
truthfulness of the speaker damages directly their positive face (Kleuter, 2007). Yet, 
although agreement is preferred over the FTA of disagreement due to the 
aforementioned reasons, in many occasions it is of greater importance to disagree in 
order to defend one’s point of view rather than to constrain from someone losing their 
face (Kotthoff, 1993; Locher, 2004 as cited in Kleuter, 2007). To do so, Levinson and 
Brown (1987) (as cited in Holtgraves, 1997) outline various politeness strategies used to 
perform these acts in a less threatening manner. Although there are positive, negative 
and off-record politeness strategies, it might be hard to apply a negative politeness 
strategy to save the positive face (Holtgraves, 1997); thus, I will only consider the 
positive politeness strategies. Among the strategies that seek for the positive face of the 
hearer, looking for an area of agreement or accomplishing the hearer’s desires were 
suggested. In order to do so, users of language might “find ways of agreeing while 
disagreeing or minimize the extent of the disagreement” (Holtgraves, 1997, p. 225). In 
addition, they may use implicit disagreements, or hesitating hedges such as well in 
pursuance of minimizing the threat (Holtgraves, 1997).  
Even though contradiction and disagreement may carry a negative connotation, they 
need not necessarily be regarded as something adverse to be avoided, since on the 
assumption that discussants are willing to resolve the disputes, the disagreement 
between them could contribute to the development of intellectual process. For a 
discussion to be solved in a reasonably manner, the exchange of opinions will occur in 
form of argumentation, and the discussants will attack and defend the standpoints in a 
rational manner (Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1984). Participants’ standpoints can be 
positive or negative depending on whether they express a positive or negative 
committedness towards an expressed opinion, and the arguments in defence of these 
standpoints will justify or refute the given statement, regarding the acceptability or 
unacceptability of it. Consequently, refutations will arise whenever the 
argumentation is in favour of a negative standpoint, what is known as contra-
argumentation (Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1984).   
 
The different types of refutations (direct and indirect) used in argumentation can be 
employed to identify different linguistic meanings with regard to the part of information 
in the sentence they refer to. On the one hand, the main part of an utterance, the 
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assertion, is the one central to the speaker’s concerns, and it is considered to be the 
foregrounded information; while the part of secondary importance, the presupposition, 
is the backgrounded information (Kadmon, 2001). As Kadmon (2001) states, the 
foregrounded part, which as previously mentioned is the at-issue content of the 
utterance, demands straightforward responses, for instance I don’t think so or Yes, I 
agree. Hence, taking into account that presuppositions are backgrounded, direct 
responses will target assertions rather than presuppositions (Kadmon, 2001). Thus, a 
direct refutation (I don’t think so, that’s not true) will directly refer to the speaker’s 
main point. Note the following examples by García Murga (2014:240) (my own 
translations):  
 
(4) a. El ejercicio ha sido hoy interesante.  
a. The exercise today was interesting. 
b. Ha habido un ejercicio.  
b. There was an exercise. 
 
(5) a. No, el ejercicio ha sido aburrido. 
a. No, the exercise was boring. 
b. ?? No, no ha habido ningún ejercicio hoy.  
b. ?? No, there was no exercise today. 
 
In examples (4) and (5) it can be observed how when directly calling into question an 
utterance, the refutation does not affect the presupposition (in this case, that there was 
an exercise) but the assertion (that the exercise was interesting).  
In order to refute presuppositions, Shanon (1976) (as cited in Potts, 2008), introduced 
the Hey, wait a minute test, (from now on HWAM), in pursuance of comprehensive 
distinctions among the different types of conveyed content (Potts, 2008). This test was 
later on popularized by von Fintel (2004) (as cited in Potts, 2008) and has become a 
widely used tool to distinguish presuppositions from assertions (Potts, 2008).  
As represented in example (6) by von Fintel (2004: 271), the HWAM test is 
illegitimate with assertions. 
(6) A: The mathematician who proved Goldbach’s Conjecture is a woman. 
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  B: Hey, wait a minute. I had no idea that someone proved Goldbach’s 
  Conjecture. 
  B: #Hey, wait a minute. I had no idea that that was a woman. 
 
Therefore, von Fintel (2004) and von Fintel & Matthewson’s (2006) contributions 
allow the following generalizations about presuppositions (Potts, 2008): 
1) The HWAM test is appropriate for refuting the presuppositional content of an 
utterance (Potts, 2008). 
2) The HWAM test is not appropriate for refuting the assertion of an utterance. 
(Potts, 2008). 
In addition, the first generalization can implicitly suggest that: 
3) If HWAM test is appropriate for refuting presuppositional content, then the 
utterance refuted is a presupposition (Potts, 2008). 
Thus, on the strength of the aforementioned generalizations, it could be assumed that 
the HWAM test functions exclusively and entirely with presuppositions (Potts, 2008).  
Nonetheless, in Potts’ (2008) paper, whose goal is to test these hypotheses against 
naturally occurring data, he concludes that this test did not work with many of his 
examples, as it also targeted assertions. 
3. Methodology 
3.1 Description of Materials 
On the basis of what the literature says on how to refute assertions and 
presuppositions, I wanted to take real samples from conversations and assess 
naturalistic data. To this end, I collected refutation instances by going through the 
transcripts of 22 episodes of the American talk-show Meet the Press; more precisely, 
the Sunday shows from March 7, 2016 until January 8, 2017, gathering in total 22 hours 
of the programme. NBC’s Meet the Press is an American TV show dealing with all 
aspects of political issues by means of a one-to-one interview and a roundtable 
discussion. Despite the profile of the guests being highly changeable, hosting people of 
different sex, age and background, most of them are political figures. I considered using 
this programme, since in my view, political debates are prone to contain a high number 
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of refutations by virtue of the controversial opinions that may constantly arise in them; 
and hence, provide me with a wide range of tokens that could be interesting for the 
study.  
However, there are major limitations that hinder the generalizability of the research.  
On the one hand, the sample is not significant as it was collected arbitrarily. 
Additionally, it is very small, which incapacitates me to guarantee that the frequency of 
appearance of one expression with one meaning type is statistically significant. Thus, 
the purpose of the present paper is to study some naturally occurring data so as to 
investigate what types of expressions are used to refute different meaning types, rather 
than to obtain frequency data or statistic correlations.   
3.2 Organization of the Data 
As a first step, I collected the examples in context: overall, the paragraph preceding 
the refutation, and the paragraph containing the refutation; thus, containing 2 discourse 
turns. Gathering the data in context was important to get a sense of the conversation and 
classify the utterances that preceded the refutations.  Be that as it may, when annotating 
the data I did not include the complete paragraph, but exclusively the sentence being 
refuted and the refutation (except when the content refuted was not immediately 
preceding the refutation, in those cases I included the whole conversation turn that 
included the sentence being refuted). In addition, I did not classify the preceding 
utterance to the refutation other than in its linguistic meaning: presupposition or 
assertion. In any case, I assessed the refutation in terms of whether it was direct or 
indirect, and immediately preceding the utterance refuted or not. In order to do this, I 
created a table (see the appendix) where I included the item number, the content 
preceding the refutation, the refutation, they type of content being refuted 
(presupposition or assertion), the type of refutation (direct or indirect), whether the 
refutation was referring to a fact or an opinion and whether the refuted content was 
immediately preceding the last utterance or not. However, the column containing 
whether the information was a fact or an opinion did not result of great utility since I 
had difficulty differentiating opinions from interpretations of a fact;  thus, I decided to 
eliminate it. Additionally, although central to my research were the direct refutation No, 
that’s not true and the indirect HWAM, my secondary goal in this research was to 
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collect different means of expressing direct and indirect refutations, so I included and 
commented on more items than the previous two.  
4. Analysis of the Data 
Taking into consideration Brown and Levinson’s (1987) definition of face, 
refutations are a threat to the hearer’s face since they question the truthfulness of the 
foregoing utterance, and therefore damage the hearer’s positive face. For this reason, 
they can be categorized as FTA and assuming that uttering them is an uncomfortable 
situation for speakers, one would presume that in pursuance of lessening this threat, 
speakers would seek indirect methods to disagree, by means of politeness strategies. 
Moreover, in line with the literature, the natural way to refute an assertion is by using a 
direct refutation such as, No, that’s not true, or I don’t think so (Kadmon, 2001). whilst 
in order to refute a presupposition, indirect ways are preferred (von Fintel, 2004; Potts, 
2008). As Holtgraves (1997) and Pomerantz (1984) point out, disagreements usually 
tend to be softened by hesitating prefaces or weak agreements, so I expected some 
hedges such as well, to be found among refutations as a way to minimize the threat.  
Finally, based on the theoretic literature, I assumed that the HWAM  token was only 
used to refute presuppositions (von Fintel, 2004); however as Potts’s (2008) recent 
study calls into question this idea and revealed some cases in which the test involved 
assertions, I could expect to encounter such cases throughout my data.  
On that note, and as a way to present the hypotheses more clearly, they could be 
endorsed by the generalizations in 1-5 as follows: 
1) If refutations are a FTA, indirect methods should be more prominent than direct 
ones. 
2) If direct refutations target the at issue content of an utterance, assertions should 
be negated by means of direct refutations such as No, that’s not true. 
3) If indirect refutations target the presupposition of an utterance, presuppositions 
should be negated by means of indirect refutations such as HWAM. 
4) If speakers take into account verbal courtesy, hesitating prefaces or weak 
agreements such as well should be found. 
5) Following the theoretical literature, since HWAM has direct access to 
presuppositionality, it should exclusively work with presuppositions. 
Nevertheless, based on an empirical study with similar aims to this paper, I 
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should not only expect to find the previously mentioned construction targeting 
presuppositions, but also assertions.  
Before analysing the data I would like to clarify what has been considered direct and 
indirect when collecting the refutations and classifying them. Refutations are any 
expression used in a way to avoid a speaker’s proposition to be accepted by the rest of 
the hearers. All the different techniques that can be carried out to refute are standardly 
classed in two types, which I define as follows: 
1) Direct refutation: a refutation is conducted in a direct way when it is done 
blatantly, this is, including the particle no, or assessments such as wrong, false, I 
don’t think so, etc. 
 
2)  Indirect refutation: a refutation is conducted in an indirect way when the speaker 
conveys that she does not yet accept the truth of the proposition that has been 
immediately uttered, so she interrupts the discourse momentarily in order to 
decide whether a certain part of the previous content could be accepted. Hence, 
they do not contain explicit expression of objection or denial. 
4.1 Direct refutations 
4.1.1 Assertions  
As we will see, the expressions found in examples 1-9 are used with the purpose of 
expressing dissent regarding a proposition uttered by another discussant. These 
expressions target directly the at issue content of the utterance; that is, the speakers 
main point or the foregrounded information. What is more, speaker A is not taking any 
information for granted, but she is making a further contribution, from which we can 
conclude that speaker A’s utterances are assertions. Although there might be a number 
of ways of directly refuting them, the methods presented below are the ones that 
predominated in our corpus. 
  I don’t think: 
(7) A: This feels like a slight rollback— 
 B: I don't think so. I actually don't think it's a rollback 
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To illustrate what has been mentioned above, here we know that B’s utterance is a 
refutation of the previous assertion, because the main point of A’s utterance is to resolve 
the issue of whether this feels like a rollback. A claims it is, but B doesn’t think so. 
Hence, both discussants have opposed views on the main point of the conversation. 
 That’s not true / wrong: 
(8) A: You picked sides.  
 B: No, that’s not true, Rick. 
 
 Explicit negation marker no: 
By using the explicit negation marker no, speaker B directly targets the main point of 
the previous utterance.     
(9) A: I would rather lose than win the way you guys did.  
 B: No you wouldn't.  
 
 Corrections: 
This method is the most frequent one in our corpus whereby the speaker refutes the 
assertion by negating the explicit content in the utterance without directly expressing 
that the other participant is wrong. This technique does not seem to match our definition 
of direct refutation, which states that a direct refutation is carried out in a blatant 
manner, including words such as no, wrong, false, I don’t think so etc. Nevertheless, I 
will consider it as a subtype of it, since, regardless of having no explicit refutation 
marker, there is an explicit negation of the content conveyed by the preceding utterance. 
This is shown in (10). 
(10) A: The media, hitting the media is always a crutch for you guys. 
  B: It's not a, it's not a crutch. 
As illustrated in (11), in many cases, the hearer seems to be defending herself or a 
third person after having been reproached (be a cause of blame), or for having 
interpreted the hearer’s words. In our data, being reproached has been a common reason 
to find refutations.  
(11) A: You were just implying this stuff was made up.  
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 B: I'm not implying it was made up.   
In the following example I’d like to point out that the refutation has been effected in 
a positive way since the content refuted was a negative assertion. Even if p and q are in 
a contradiction relation, being p the content refuted and q the refutation; this does not 
imply the refutation has to be negative. In fact, the polarity of the refutation depends on 
the preceding assertion (Moeschler, 1982). In example (12), furthermore, the verb did 
has been used for emphasizing the positive polarity. Note also that this conversation 
was carried out in a roundtable, thus, speaker B is refuting A’s utterance although she is 
not the addressee A is referring to.   
(12) A: You're not answering my question. 
 B:  He did answer your question. 
 
 The token I’m not saying:  
In some situations, as reflected in (13), it seems that the hearer has been put certain 
words in her mouth she claims not to have mentioned, so the refutation is not claiming 
the truthfulness of a fact but how the listener has interpreted the speaker’s words. In 
order to refute those words, she starts the utterance by I’m not saying or similar 
constructions. Even though this expression does not correspond to our prototypical 
definition of direct refutations, I will consider it as such because as in the previous 
subclass, “negation of the explicit content”, the speaker negates explicitly what the prior 
participant has stated. 
(13) A: Bannon is already making his influence felt in innuendo about  
  Clinton's health.  
 B: I'm not saying that, you know, she's had a stroke or anything like that, 
  but this is not the woman we're used to seeing.  
In the case of example (14), speaker A is producing a raising declarative, which 
implies a bias towards a positive answer (Gunglogson, 2003); therefore, A does not 
express an assertion, but a belief, an inference or conclusion about what B has 
previously said in form of a question. B however, does not seem to agree with A’s 
interpretation of her utterance, so she refutes it.  
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(14) A: He wasn't running for President, so it's okay to make unwanted  
  sexual advances?  
 B: Chuck, Chuck, I'm not saying it was the right thing to do.  
4.1.2 Presuppositions   
Contrary to our expectations, the findings revealed that most of the presuppositions 
were refuted in a direct way, just as the assertions I analysed. This data has been 
classified following the same scheme as for assertions; nonetheless, no cases of I don’t 
think so or That’s not true/ Wrong were found: 
 Corrections: 
Von Fintel (2004) proposes that the refutation of a presupposition should be carried 
out by means of an indirect refutation, such as HWAM. Notwithstanding this, in our 
examples there were cases in which I did not find such construction.  
(15) A: I think as soon as the audit is completed Donald Trump will release— 
 B: There is no audit on this return.  
 
In example (15), the uttered sentence conveys that there is an audit under 
consideration; that is, the definite article the introducing the audit, presupposes the 
existence and uniqueness of the audit.  Speaker A is therefore taking for granted the 
existence of this audit and speaker B does not seem to be in accordance and refutes the 
presupposed content.    
In some cases, as it occurred with  assertions, we found instances in which speaker A 
is taking for granted some information about speaker B, which the latter does not seem 
to accept, and thus, refutes it.  In the two examples presented below the presupposition 
is triggered by the wh question markers why and what respectively. In situation (16), 
speaker A is presupposing that there is a reason for speaker B to parse and the latter 
does not seem to accept that information; whereas in example (17), speaker A 
presupposes her discussant is deflecting something which she does not accept as true.  
(16) A: And I understand why you're trying to parse this.  
 B: I'm not trying to parse it. 
(17) A: I get what you're deflecting. 
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 B: I'm not deflecting.  
 
 The explicit negation marker no: 
 Example (18) is an interesting case. Even though in general terms and following 
the literature, no targets assertions, it is not clear whether here “the striking thing” is 
working as a factive predicate or not. If that is the case, speaker B would be refuting the 
presupposition that Donald Trump’s unfavourable ratings are higher than Secretary 
Clinton’s. However, if it is not factive, we would be talking about a refutation of the 
assertion, that is, the truth of the statement.  
(18) A: The striking thing here is that Donald Trump's unfavorable ratings are  
  actually higher than Secretary Clinton’s.         
  B: No, actually, I've got a survey in Ohio that says Hillary Clinton's 
  negatives are higher than Donald Trump's.  
4.2 Indirect refutations  
4.2.1 Assertions  
Although according to the literature assertions demand straightforward responses, 
that is, direct refutations, the data revealed that indirect refutations are also employed to 
reject assertions. The methods that we will analyse next are means of politeness 
strategies. 
 The hesitating hedge well: 
This hedge was found in several refutations. Well is considered a hesitating hedge 
and it is used as a displace agreement; this is, when a turn is dispreferred (disagreement 
over agreement, or refutations in our corpus), the speaker makes use of these false starts 
as a way to delay the refutation (Holtgraves, 1997). Although this item was found in 
different contexts, it is used as a displace agreement in order to mitigate the threat to the 
hearer’s positive face in all cases. 
The following case (19) reflects how to lessen the threat towards speaker A’s 
positive face, speaker B uses the hedge well as a politeness strategy before giving her 
opinion. Since B’s opinion does not concur with her interactant’s, she refutes A’s 
assertion by employing this strategy as a manner to partly agree with the hearer.  
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(19) A: I tend to agree with Mary that he would be just be bored to tears as 
  Vice Presidency— 
 B: Well, I don't think he'd be bored.  
In example (20) it can be observed that well is used as a way to briefly agree with the 
speaker’s foregoing turn and subsequently introduce a contrastive utterance by means of 
the marker but in order to express disagreement with what was previously asserted. 
According to Brown and Levinson (1987), this is a politeness strategy called token 
agreement. Additionally, in this same example, participant B not only uses the displace 
agreement well as a way to delay the disagreement, but also the hedge opinion I 
wouldn’t say to reduce the strength of the expressed opinion (Holtgraves, 1997). In 
example (21) two token agreements can be found: well and yeah. On the other hand, 
whereas in example (20) speaker B starts her refutation by politely disagreeing with the 
hearer to later on end up agreeing, in (21) she starts by agreeing in order to end up 
disagreeing. In any case, the hedge well completes the same function in all situations. 
(20) A: Can the United States continue to have a compartmentalized  
  relationship with Russia anymore under this circumstance, which is what 
  you pursued for a long time?  
 B: Well, I wouldn't say compartmentalized, but we do have to have what 
 I'll call a strong, but also a balanced approach to Russia.  
 
(21) A: So this feels a bit overwhelming I think to people.  
 B: Well, yeah, but I think you have to keep everything in context. 
In example (22), well is used to introduce an argument against a generalization 
proposed by speaker A in which she asserts that generally speaking it is not the case not 
to have a Bush at a convention. Speaker B, in this case is refuting a generic statement, 
by giving an argument which cancels A’s assertion. By saying that A’s utterance did not 
happen four years ago, speaker B is breaking with the generalization that this situation 
repeats in time.  
(22) A: It is unusual not to have a Bush at a convention.  
 B: Well, it didn't happen four years ago, Chuck, that's not true.  
 
 Partly agreeing and partly disagreeing:  
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Apart from the hedge well, many other techniques have been found in order to refute 
the hearer’s assertion in a polite manner by partly agreeing and partly disagreeing.  
As reflected in example (23), participant B gives an argument in favour of A’s 
assertion but quickly introduces a contrastive sentence in which she gives another 
argument to refute A’s utterance. 
(23) A: And he's been completely consistent on this point.  
 B: He had deportation-- But he has not been consistent on this issue of  
 what to do with the 11 to 15 million.  
I also found an instance in which the token agreement yeah and the hedge opinion I 
don’t think are used so as to minimize the strength of the expressed opinion. 
(24) A: They're gravitating to somebody that says, "I'm just gonna make it all   
  better again."   
 B: Yeah. No, I, I, I do. I-- but it's not, I don't think they're so much 
 gravitating to Trump. 
Finally, there is a an occasion in which the speaker, despite uttering she is not 
disagreeing with what was previously mentioned, introduces a contrastive utterance in 
which she presents an argument in order to express her opposite opinion. She might 
have uttered “I’m not disagreeing with that” in pursuance of softening the disagreement. 
(25) A: I mean, the fallout from Iraq War, look at the Republican Party today. 
  It is more isolationist today and it's because of the failure of the Iraq war.  
 B: I'm not disagreeing with that, but I'm saying if you accuse Bush of 
 lying when he was telling what everyone believed, then you are dividing 
 the country, you are demoralizing the country. 
 
 Wait a minute:  
 In the following examples it can be observed that expressions such as HWAM do 
not only refute presuppositions. In context (26), it is uttered not to let the speaker away 
with her assertion “we have a psychopath running for President”. It is a case in which 
HWAM is used in order to access a not immediately preceding utterance. It is a way to 
impede that a non-preceding utterance is accepted as true, because speaker B has not 
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accepted it yet. If instead of using this indirect refutation the speaker had used a direct 
one, she would be refuting the immediately preceding content rather than the assertion 
she seems not to be in agreement with. Therefore, this case gives us an insight that 
indirect refutations do not only negate presuppositions, but also the content conveyed by 
not immediately preceding utterances; that is, assertions that are not elaborating on the 
current main point of the conversation.   
(26) A: I mean, basically, we have a psychopath running for President. I 
  mean, he meets the clinical definition, okay? 
 B: Wait a minute. Wait a minute. Do you really think, diagnosing people 
 on air, I assume you don't have a degree in Psychology. Is that fair? I 
 mean— 
The next situation is an example in which speaker B uses a similar construction to 
HWAM as a way to negate the truth of the immediately preceding assertion uttered by 
A, which contradicts with von Fintel’s (2004) claims that HWAM can only refute 
presuppositions. 
(27) A: You know, what, what we have this week is a, is a series of, of  
  unsubstantiated allegations. 
 B: Let me stop you there. They're not unsubstantiated.  
 
 Other methods found: 
Finally, there is an instance in which the refutation is effected throughout a 
presupposition. Considering that there are some adjectives such as glad that are used as 
presupposition triggers (Karttunen, 1971), happy that from the following example is 
acting as one. It is used by speaker B to presuppose that the R.N.C was not hacked, and 
thus, contradict the preceding utterance. The speaker is probably trying to achieve a 
concrete rhetoric effect and that is why he discards a neutral form to refute. 
(28) A: You guys have had a specific denial that the R.N.C.'s network wasn't 
  hacked. That doesn't mean Republicans associated with the R.N.C.  
  weren't hacked. That doesn't rule that out. 




 In this section, we will look at the different techniques for refuting presuppositions 
indirectly. Based on the literature, the natural way to execute this action is by 
expressions such as HWAM; however, additional methods were encountered. 
 The hesitating hedge well: 
The use of this hedge was the most recurrent way to indirectly refute 
presuppositions. As we mentioned in the well section for assertions, the use of this 
hedge may have different specific purposes according to the context, but overall it is 
used as a way to delay the refutation and try to mitigate the threat to the positive face of 
the hearer. Notwithstanding this, when refuting presuppositions, it might have an 
additional function: likewise the construction HWAM, well can also be employed as a 
manner to stop the ongoing discourse momentarily in order not to let the speaker away 
with her presupposition. 
(29)  A: Well, look, I know the glass-is-half-empty tendency of many in the 
   media.  
  B: Well, it's not about the media, sir.  
 
 Wait a minute: 
(30) A: I think to compare someone that we know gave away national secrets 
  to--  
  B: Wait a minute, you are making assumptions, we don't know that.  
 
The previous example matches our expectations drawn from the literature. Here, the 
factive verb know is introducing the presupposition that someone gave national secrets 
and speaker B is momentarily stopping the discourse in order not to let speaker A away 
with this presupposition.  
4.3 Discussion 
The starting point for the present research was on the one hand, that direct refutations 
express dissent to the proposition uttered by another interactant by assessments such as 
that’s not true, wrong, I don’t think so etc., or the explicit negation marker no. This type 
of direct responses target the at-issue content of the prior speaking turn; thus, 
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considering that presuppositions are backgrounded and do not accept direct responses, 
at least initially; this direct responses target assertions. On the other hand, the 
prototypical indirect refutation claimed in the literature, HWAM, is a way to stop the 
current discourse momentarily, not to let the speaker away with her presupposition. 
Therefore, it is a useful method to identify presuppositions, as according to the 
literature, it functions exclusively with them.  
On this basis, we expected assertions to be refuted in a direct way, by means of 
tokens such as no, wrong, I don’t think so or false; and presuppositions indirectly, with 
expressions such as HWAM. Nevertheless, there is another proposal which seems to be 
impacted by this theory; as Potts (2008) pointed out cases in his study in which HWAM 
targeted assertions.  
In addition, we should bear in mind Brown and Levinson’s concept of face. 
According to them, we as interactants tend to safe face by means of politeness 
strategies, such as agreeing while disagreeing, or the use of certain tokens that minimize 
the threat, due to the fact that disagreeing is uncomfortable for any speaker as it 
threatens the positive face of the listener. Consequently, based on this idea, I expected 
indirect refutations to be more prominent that direct ones.  
Taking all of this into account, I will proceed to portray what the natural occurring 
data suggested and whether it was compatible with the hypotheses laid out at the 
beginning of section 4. 
To begin with, the results gathered referring to direct refutations met our 
expectations. The data showed that, overall, this refuting type was used to negate 
assertions, as we had foreseen. Nevertheless, although it was more frequent to find 
cases in which direct refutations negated assertions, we also found cases in which 
presuppositions were negated this way. Moreover, various different techniques used to 
refute assertions were also found to negate presuppositions. Among the many different 
direct refutations methods that may exist, the following are the ones that were found in 
our corpus for assertions: 1) I don’t think 2) That’s not true / Wrong 3) Explicit 
negation marker no, 4) Corrections, and 5) The token I’m not saying From those, 
number 3 and 4 were also applied for presuppositions. The technique to refute both 
linguistic meanings directly that speakers seem to prefer was to negate the content from 
the preceding turn but without inserting any negation marker, or what I labelled as 
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corrections. In the case of assertions, this could be because among all the direct 
refutation manners that were employed in the data, this one might be the less 
threatening one. Nevertheless, in the case of presuppositions, questions remain open. By 
just negating the explicit content without any expression that holds the ongoing 
conversation, the speaker may not have needed to stop it in order to choose whether 
they accept or not the truth of the foregoing utterance because he did not accept it from 
the very beginning. Conversely, it could just be that other refutation methods are more 
common than the prototypical indirect HWAM. However, these results might be 
controversial, since by directly refuting an utterance, we are straightforwardly replying 
the truth of the statement; that is, the at-issue content and not the presupposition. 
On the other hand, regarding indirect refutations and contrary to our expectations, 
there were more cases in which this refutation type referred to assertions than to 
presuppositions. Nonetheless, this could merely be a random result, because in our 
corpus assertions outnumbered presuppositions. Notwithstanding, as the present 
research is not quantitative, we did not pay much attention to the frequency of each type 
of technique, and focused on whether the data matched the literature.  
Despite according to the literature assertions demand straightforward responses, that 
is, direct refutations; considering the concept of face introduced by Brown and Levinson 
(1987), it is not striking to have encountered so many indirect ways of refuting 
assertions. The different techniques used were 1) the hesitating hedge well, 2) the 
mechanism of partly agreeing and partly disagreeing, 3) the HWAM and 4) other 
methods. The first and second methods, which were the most prominent, are part of 
Brown and Levinson’s (1987) politeness strategies. Overall, what the hesitating hedge 
well does in these cases is to delay the refutation by displacing the agreement in 
pursuance of lessening the threat to the positive face of the listener. The second method 
presented here is also a way to refute in a more polite manner, by agreeing with the 
listener up to a point and quickly introducing a contrastive argument. Moreover, in 
many of the refutations classified in the previously mentioned subtypes, we found many 
other tokens to lessen the threat to the hearer’s face, such as the token agreement yeah 
(20) and (21); or the hedge opinion I woulnd’t say (20). Thus, it could be concluded that 
even though assertions are meant to be refuted directly, speakers may choose to do it 
indirectly so as to feel less threatening when contradicting. Regarding the HWAM 
expression, which originally was believed to function exclusively with presuppositions, 
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we perceived that it also reacts to assertions. On the one hand, it is a way to access not 
immediately preceding assertions (26). Using this expression, the speaker is 
momentarily stopping the ongoing discourse as a way to show the hearer that she has 
not yet accepted the truth of the not immediately preceding sentence. By directly 
refuting, one would be referring to the prior utterance and letting the speaker away with 
whatever she mentioned before and the hearer does not agree with. Therefore, our 
results showed that HWAM might have an extra use apart from helping us identify 
presuppositions, and that usage is that of refuting not immediately preceding content. 
Nevertheless, there were also cases in which HWAM was used to refute immediately 
preceding assertions (27), as expected from Potts (2008) study, and which seems to 
contradict the claim that HWAM is not suitable for refuting at-issue content. Finally, we 
also found a case (28) in which the refutation was done by means of a presupposition. 
The refutation contained a presupposition that implied that what the discussant had 
mentioned was not true. The speaker might have had a concrete discursive intention by 
uttering the sentence that way. Although I cannot conclude what that was, I can 
speculate that, in using a presupposition triggered by an emotive factive predicate, the 
speaker presents the information as though it should already be common knowledge. So 
it is not really a content that is up for debate. 
Regarding the indirect refutations affecting presuppositions, our expectations were 
quite satisfied. We found some cases of HWAM or similar expressions and hesitating 
hedges such as well.  However, what is striking here is that although von Fintel (2004) 
in his paper states the way to refute presuppositions is by using certain constructions 
such as HWAM, we found that when bringing the literature into natural conversation, 
speakers do not tend to choose this technique as frequently as expected. Both techniques 
(hesitating hedge and HWAM) were used as a way to stop the discourse in order to 
process what the other person took for granted and take some time to choose whether it 
is accepted or not. Nevertheless, this last technique had various uses: as we saw in the 
precedent paragraph, it was also used as a way to negate the not immediately preceding 
content and immediately preceding assertions.   
Finally, I also found an interesting example (12) in which the presupposition was 
carried out positively. This case arises in contexts in which the preceding utterance is 
expressed in a negative way, since the fact that a refutation is a contradiction to other 
discussants statement, does not necessarily mean it has to be carried out negatively.  
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To recap, I consider that although part of what the literature says was fulfilled, some 
results differed greatly. On the one hand, we found out that direct refutations may be 
used both for assertions and presuppositions and that indirect refutations are very 
frequent with assertions. While I find the former situation controversial and I am still 
not certain about it, the later could be a result of speakers trying to diminish the threat to 
the hearer’s positive face. On the other hand, we observed that the expression HWAM 
does not only refute presuppositions but also not immediately preceding content, and 
assertions; and that there are more techniques to refute indirectly than the prototypical 
one. 
5. Conclusion 
The purpose of this paper was to analyse refutations in natural occurring data in 
order to prove whether they met what the theoretical literature had investigated on this 
topic. My primary goal was to make generalizations by connecting the refutation types 
with the meaning types, and see whether the verbal courtesy had an effect in the way we 
refute or not. While it is too soon to confirm the conclusions, my view after having 
analysed the gathered data is the following: 
Does direct refutation only negate assertion? 
Although in general, direct refutations targeted assertion, I encountered several 
challenging cases through the corpus in which presuppositions were negated by means 
of direct refutations. Since the data did not match my hypothesis based on what the 
theoretical literature states; that is, that direct refutations only target assertions, these 
cases deserve a fundamental explanation that could be left for further research.   
Does indirect refutation only negate presupposition? 
Our results reflected that indirect refutation is used for both assertions and 
presuppositions, and that this could be a consequence of the speaker’s desire to lessen 
the threat that disagreeing with a participant supposes. Moreover, we found out that 
there are other indirect refutation techniques apart from the prototypical one (HWAM) 
and that it is not always the case that the indirect refutation HWAM negates a 
presupposition as von Fintel (2004) had suggested. This technique can also be employed 
to negate an immediately preceding and a not immediately preceding assertion.   
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How do contents get refuted? 
On the one hand, we found that both assertions and presuppositions were directly 
refuted by means of expressions such as: that’s not true/wrong, explicit negation marker 
no and I don’t think. Nevertheless, these techniques were more prominent in assertions, 
at it could be expected from the literature. On the other hand, our results also suggested 
that indirect refutations can be used for both linguistic meaning types, although they 
might have a different purpose in each. When targeting assertions, indirect refutations 
such as well are carried out as a politeness strategy in pursuance of mitigating the threat 
to the positive face of the hearer; however, when refuting presuppositions they are 
employed as a manner to interrupt the conversation and analyse whether the prior 
participant’s presupposition will be accepted. Furthermore, HWAM can refute a not 
preceding assertion, or hold the conversation in order not to let a speaker away with a 
presupposition.  
Given this, and on the basis of the naturally occurring data that I analysed, I will 
conclude that the use of direct and indirect refutations is not a totally reliable diagnostic 
to identify meaning types, as there were many challenging cases that did not match the 
expectations. For this reason, I will leave for further research the employment of 
HWAM targeting immediately preceding assertions, and the use of direct refutations 
targeting presuppositions. It would also be interesting to do a cross-linguistic study and 
compare whether these results reflect in other languages. Indirect refutations affecting 
assertions could be something cultural as some languages and cultures are more 
straightforward than others and may have different feelings about saving the other 
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Item Refuted content Refuation Refutation type Refuted meaning type Content immediately precedent 
Item 1 A: You picked sides B: No, that's not true, Rick Direct Assertion Immedately preceding
Item 2 A:Can the United States continue to 
have a compartmentalized relationship 
with Russia anymore under
this circumstance, which is what 
you pursued for a long time? 
B:Well, I wouldn't say 
compartmentalized,
 but we do have to have
 what I'll call a strong, but also a
 balanced approach to Russia. 
Indirect Assertion Immediately preceding
Item 3 A:You guys have had a specific denial that 
the R.N.C.'s network wasn't hacked. That 
doesn't mean Republicans associated with 
the R.N.C. weren't hacked. That doesn'trule 
that out.
B: (…)you should actually--be happy 
that the R.N.C. wasn't hacked. 








Item 4 A: Reince, that means you do not 
believe--the assessments of the U.S. 
intelligence community.
B:How can-- wait a second, now 
you're so circuitous here, Chuck. 
Indirect Assertion Immediately preceding 
Item 5 B:How can-- wait a second, now 
you're so circuitous here, Chuck. 
B: No, I'm just saying-- Direct Assertion Immediately preceding 
Item 6 A: You are getting briefings on this. B:Number one, I don't have-- 
I'm not in those briefings, first of all. 
Direct Assertion Not immediately preceding
Item 7 A:You're ignoring The Washington Post
 report for obvious reasons, because you
 want to deny the R.N.C. aspect of that.
B:No, I'm not ignoring The 
Washington Post report. 
Direct Assertion Immediately preceding
Item 8
A:You dispute 17 different intelligence 
agencies that have assessed that Russia
 agents were behind this? You dispute this? 
B:Chuck, this is insane. In the 
same article, about those 17
 agencies, that the report was
 inconclusive. 
Indirect Assertion Immediatly preceding
Item 9 A:In the same article, about those 17 
agencies, that the report was inconclusive.
B:It was inconclusive about-- --
Vladimir Putin, Reince. It was 
not inconclusive-- --that Russian 
agents were involved
Indirect Assertion Not immediately preceding 
Item 10 A: And I understand why you're trying 
to parse this. 
B:I'm not trying to parse it Direct Presupposition Immediately preceding 
Item 11 A:You would have to believe, and obviously 
I can't go into the classified information,but 
you'd have to believe that the uniform  
nature of the hacking and the dumping of 
information that was damaging to Secretary 
Clinton and helpful to Donald Trump was 
both coincidental and accidental and the 
Russians didn't know what they're doing, to 
believe that they had no interest in helping 
one 
candidate. That's simply not credible. 
B: Well, I understand that. 
But let me play devil's advocate here. 
Indirect Assertion Immediately precedent
Item 12 A: I would rather lose than win the way 
you guys did. 
B: No you wouldn't. Direct Assertion Immediately precedent
Item 13 A:Well, look, I know the glass-is-half-empty 
tendency of many in the media. 
B:Well, it's not about the media,sir Indirect Presupposition Immediately precedent
Item 14 A:The media, hitting the media is always 
a crutch for you guys. 
B:It's not a, it's not a crutch. Direct Assertion Immediately precedent
Item 15 A: You're not answering my question B: He did answer your question. Direct Assertion Immediately precedent
Item 16 A: Why are you campaigning against Mitt 
Romney as Secretary of State? 
B: I'm not campaigning against
 anyone. 
Direct Presupposition Immediately precedent
Item 17 A:But when you say it, when you actually 
don't have a college degree, you hear, "Oh, 
they think I'm stupid." 
B:That's not at all Direct Assertion Immediately precedent
Item 18 A: I think as soon as the audit is completed 
Donald Trump will release-- 
B:There's no audit on this return. Direct Presupposition Immediately precedent
Item 19 A: The F.B.I. has been in full revolt since the 
decisions made last summer. 
B: Not full revolt. Direct Assertion Immediately precedent
Item 20 A:Well, that's what corrupt essentially 
means. 
B:Not necessarily. Direct Assertion Immediately precedent
Item 21 A: But that's the choice we have. B: Well, no. Indirect Assertion Immediately precedent
Item 22 A: They're gravitating to somebody that 
says, "I'm just gonna make it all better 
again." 
B: Yeah. No, I, I, I do. I-- but it's not, I 





Item 23 A: You know, what, what we have this week 
is a, is a series of, of unsubstantiated 
allegations.
A: Let me stop you there. They're 
not unsubstantiated. 
Indirect Assertion Immediately precedent
Item 24 A: --is preoccupied with unsubstantiated 
claims-- B: You keep saying unsubstantiated, 
that is not true, you have a firsthand 
account. It's unproven, but they're not 
unsubstantiated. 
Direct Assertion Not immediately precedent 
Item 25 A:--He wasn't running for President, so 
it's okay to make unwanted sexual 
advances? 
B:Chuck, Chuck, I'm not saying it was 
the right thing to do. 
Direct Assertion Immediately precedent 
Item 26 A:Well, the actions would be even worse if 
they were actions. Talk and action are two 
different things. 
B:Wait a minute, New York Times, 
"Temple Taggart was 21-year-old 
beauty contestant when, she said, Mr. 
Trump kissed her on the lips, without 
invitation, at a pageant event.
Indirect Presupposition Immediately precedent 
Item 27 A:You were just implying this stuff was 
made up. 
B:I'm not implying it was made up. Direct Assertion Immediately precedent 
Item 28 A:He hasn't released his tax returns, which 
means he's either not that rich-- 
B: wrong Direct Assertion Immediately precedent 
Item 29 A: On Monday, you tweeted, "This debate 
was not Trump's best, but there are-- still 
two more 
B: I didn't tweet that. That's not my 
tweet. 
Direct Assertion Immediately precedent 
Item 30 A:I get what you're deflecting B:I'm not deflecting. Direct Presupposition Immediately precedent 
Item 31 A:If-- if the-- It's news to us that this was 
coming in.
B:Oh I don't think so. Direct Assertion Immediately precedent 
Item 32 A:You could put half of Trump's supporters 
into what I call "the basket of deplorables."
B:Hillary, they are not a basket of 
anything. 
Direct Presupposition Immediately precedent 
Item 33 A: I mean, the fallout from Iraq War, look at 
the Republican Party today. It is more 
isolationist today and it's because of the 
failure of the Iraq war. 
B:I'm not disagreeing with that, but 
I'm saying if you accuse Bush of lying 
when he was telling what everyone 
believed, then you are dividing the 
country, you are demoralizing the 
country
Indirect Assertion Immediately precedent 
Item 34 A:And he's been completely consistent on 
this point. 
B:: He had deportation-- But he has 
not been consistent on this issue of 
what to do with the 11 to 15 million. 
Indirect Assertion Immediately precedent 
Item 35 A:The simple truth is that what the 
American people long to see is leadership at 
the national level that doesn't myopically 
focus on the group that you're focused on 
and I know the media loves to focus on. 
B: It's not the media. Direct Presupposition Immediately precedent 
Item 36 A:And if you actually look at the work that 
The Clinton Foundation has done, it's 
actually good work.
B:Actually, it's not. Direct Assertion Immediately precedent 
Item 37 A:The striking thing here is that Donald 
Trump's unfavorable ratings are actually 
higher than Secretary Clinton's. 
B:No, actually, I've got a survey in 
Ohio that says Hillary Clinton's 
negatives are higher than Donald 
Trump's. 
Direct Presupposition Immediately precedent 
Item 38 A: So what she basically just said is she 
admitted that, right now, the Republican 
Party is a white nationalist party. And that's 
basically what she equated. 
B:No, she didn't. She equated hers is-- Direct Presupposition Immediately precedent 
Item 39 A:Bannon is already making his 
influence felt in innuendo about 
Clinton's health. 
B:I'm not saying that, you know, she's 
had a stroke or anything like that, but 
this is not the woman we're used to 
seeing. 
Direct  Assertion Immediately preceding
Item 40 A:I think to compare someone that we 
know gave away national secrets to-- 
B:Wait a minute, you are making 
assumptions, we don't know that. 
Indirect Presupposition Immediately preceding
Item 41 A:I will tell you as a lawyer James Comey 
laid out a prima facie case for gross 
negligence, absolutely. 
B:No, I understand the case he laid 
out, but we don't know factually
Direct Assertion Immediately preceding
Item 42 A:I mean, basically, we have a psychopath 
running for President. I mean, he meets the 
clinical definition, okay?
B:Wait a minute. Wait a minute. Do 
you really think, diagnosing people on 
air, I assume you don't have a degree 
in Psychology. Is that fair? I mean-- 
Indirect Assertion Not immediately preceding
Item 43 A:But that's not an excuse for breaking the 
law. 
B:I'm not saying that's an excuse Direct  Assertion Immediately preceding
Item 44 A:The quo and quid pro quo is the meeting 
and you cannot set up meetings on behalf 
of-- 
B:But one moment, the quid here is to 
very wealthy people, "Give us money, 
so we can give 11.5 million people 
AIDS drugs." And the quo is, "Huma 
Abedin may call you back." That is not 
a quid pro quo, in a sense.
Indirect Assertion Immediately preceding
Item 45 A:How does a 70 year old woman start 
persuading people she's telling the truth? 
B:Well, first of all, she isn't 70 Indirect  Assertion Immediately preceding
Item 46 A:And if he gets distracted like this, why 
shouldn't this be an issue that concerns 
voters of him in the Oval Office if he can so 
easily get distracted by personal criticism? 
B:He's not distracted Direct Assertion Immediately preceding
Item 47 A:This feels like a slight rollback-- B: I don't think so. I actually don't 
think it's a rollback
Direct Assertion
Item 48 A:"It's a rookie mistake, and it proves that 
Trump needs people like us around to help 
steer him in the right direction on some 
basic things." 
B:He's 100 percent wrong Direct  Assertion Immediately preceding
Item 49 A:It is unusual not to have a Bush at a 
convention. 
B:Well, it didn't happen four years 
ago, Chuck, that's not true. 
Indirect Assertion Immediately preceding
Item 50 A:So this feels a bit overwhelming I think to 
people. 
B:Well, yeah, but I think you have 
to keep everything in context
Indirect Assertion Immediately preceding
Item 51 A:But the whole political strategy of getting 
out the white vote is morally problematic 
and very dangerous
B:Well, hold on. So it is about race Indirect Presupposition Immediately preceding
Item 52 A: I tend to agree with Mary that he would 
be just be bored to tears as Vice Presidendy-
- 
B:Well, I don't think he'd be bored. Indirect Assertion Immediately preceding
